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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Roberto Moran-Soto appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver. Specifically, he contends the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the methamphetamine officers found in his pockets.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedincts
Sergeant Hoadley and Officer Hemmert entered a Caldwell bar looking for
two fugitive individuals who were known to frequent that location. (SH Tr., p.8,
Ls.13-22; p.32, L.20 - p.33, ~.2.') The officers did not locate the fugitives, but
did observe Roberto Moran-Soto and David Castro sitting next to each other at
the bar. (SH Tr., p.13, L.18 - p.16. L.8; p.33, L.3

- p.34, L.6.)

Sergeant Hoadley

saw Castro push a napkin away from himself onto the bartender's lower side of
the bar. (SH Tr., p.33, Ls.10-16.) Officer Hemmert saw plastic hanging out of
the crumpled napkin. (SH Tr., p.8, L.25 - p.9, L.lO.) He opened the napkin, and
found two plastic baggies with a crystal substance inside that he believed to be
methamphetamine or cocaine. (SH Tr., p.9, L.15 - p.13, L.7.) Officer Hemmert
detained both Castro and the bartender, but not Moran-Soto, with handcuffs.
(SH Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.3.) Castro told Sergeant Hoadley that Moran-Soto
was attempting to sell him methamphetamine at the bar. (SH Tr., p.57, Ls.7-19.)
Sergeant Hoadley then asked Moran-Soto, in English, for identification,
which Moran-Soto provided. (SH Tr., p.46, Ls.5-19.) Sergeant Hoadley also
1

"SH Tr." refers to the suppression hearing transcript, which includes both the
11/6/08 and 11/13/08 hearings, with pages consecutively numbered.

asked Moran-Soto if he had anything illegal on him. (SH Tr., p.47, Ls.9-23.)
Moran-Soto responded, in English, that he did not, and told the officer he could
"check." (SH Tr., p.48, Ls.1-7.) Sergeant Hoadley, wary of reaching into MoranSoto's pockets due to the possibility of needles being present, asked Moran-Soto
to empty his pockets, which he did. (SH Tr., p.48, Ls.9-18.) Sergeant Hoadley
asked Moran-Soto if he "had anything else" and Moran-Soto raised his arm, and
again said, "check." (SH Tr., p.48, L.24 - p.49, L.3.) Sergeant Hoadley reached
into Moran-Soto's pocket and found a plastic bindle which appeared to
Seargeant Hoadley to contain methamphetamine. (SH Tr., p.48, L.24 - p.49,
L.24.) Moran-Soto was arrested, Mirandized, and charged with possession of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver. (SH Tr., p.51, L.15 - p.54, L.12; R.,
pp.20-21.)
Moran-Soto filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine, and his
statements admitting ownership of the methamphetamine made after his arrest.
(R., pp.24-25.) After a hearing, the district court granted his motion with regard
to his statements, concluding that the Miranda warnings given to Moran-Soto
were not communicated in a fashion that could be clearly understood, given
Moran-Soto's limited understanding of English. (SH Tr., p.123, L.6
L.23.)

-

p.124,

However, the district court denied the motion with regard to the

methamphetamine found in Moran-Soto's pockets, concluding that Moran-Soto
did speak some English, and that his verbal and non-verbal responses to
Sergeant Hoadley's requests exhibited voluntary consent to search his person.
(SHTr.,p.121,Ls.16-22;p.124,L.24-p.125,L.21.)

Moran-Soto entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver, preserving his right to appeal the district court's
ruling in the motion to suppress.

(R.,pp.48-49.)

The court imposed a unified

sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, but suspended the sentence and
placed Moran-Soto on probation.

(R.,pp.53-57.)

deported2 (R., p.77). but filed a timely notice of appeal.

He was subsequently

(R.,pp.63-66.)

On December 22, 2009, the state filed a motion to dismiss Moran-Soto's appeal
due to his deportation and subsequent absconding from probation for failing to
contact the probation and parole office. As of this writing, he has an active
probation violation warrant for his arrest.

Moran-Soto states the issue on appeal as:
In light of the State's failure to meet its burden of showing
that Mr. Moran-Soto voluntarily consented to the search of his
person or that the item removed from Mr. Moran-Soto's pocket
would have been inevitably discovered by officers, did the district
court err when it denied Mr. Moran-Soto's motion to suppress the
item removed from his pocket?
(Appeilant's brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Moran-Soto failed to show that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress?

ARGUMENT
Moran-Soto Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denvina His
Motion To Sup~ress
A.

Introduction
Moran-Soto argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress the methamphetamine found in his pockets during his encounter with
police officers. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-17.) Moran-Soto's claim is without merit.
The district court correctly determined that Moran-Soto gave the officer voluntary
consent to search his pockets, and in any event, the inevitable discovery doctrine
would have precluded suppression of the methamphetamine.
B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith,
141 ldaho 728,729-730, 117 P.3d 142, 143-144 (Ct. App. 2005).
At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in
the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 ldaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997
(1995); State v. Schevers, 132 ldaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App.
1999).

C.

The District Court Correctlv Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding
That Moran-Soto's Consent To Search His Pockets Was Voluntary
A warrantless search conducted pursuant to valid consent does not violate

the Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
(citations omitted); see also State v. Varie, 135 ldaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35
(2001). The state has the burden of demonstrating consent by a preponderance
of the evidence. State v. Ballou, 145 ldaho 840, 846, 186 P.3d 696, 702 (Ct.
App. 2008).
The voluntariness of an individual's consent is evaluated in light of the
totality of the circumstances. State v. Baxter, 144 ldaho 672,681, 168 P.3d 1019
(Ct. App. 2007). In order to be valid, consent cannot be the result of duress or
coercion, either direct or implied. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248. Consent may be
voluntarily given during an investigative detention. State v. Holcomb, 128 ldaho
296,301-303,912 P.2d 664,669-671 (Ct. App. 1995). Consent to search can be
communicated through "words, gesture, or conduct." State v. Knauu, 120 ldaho
343,348,815 P.2d 1083,1088 (Ct. App. 1991).
In properly analyzing the totality of the circumstances in this case, the
district court concluded that the state had met its burden of establishing that
Moran-Soto gave voluntary consent to the officers to search his pockets. (SH Tr.,
p.124, L.24 - p.125, L.21.) This finding is supported by the record.
Moran-Soto's voluntarily-given consent to search was evidenced by
words, gestures, and conduct. When Sergeant Hoadley asked Moran-Soto if he
had anything illegal on him, Moran-Soto provided verbal consent by telling the
officer to "check, after responding that he did not possess anything illegal, all in

English. (SH Tr., p.47, L.7 - p.48, L.8.)

Moran-Soto also provided consent

through his conduct when he emptied the contents of his pockets onto the bar.
(SH Tr., p.48, Ls.9-18.) Moran-Soto finally provided consent through a gesture,
when he raised his arm and said "check after the officer asked him whether he
had "anything else." (SH Tr., p.48, L.23 - p.49, L.3.)
The district court also properly considered Moran-Soto's apparent
limitations in speaking English.

The court distinguished between Miranda

warnings, which contain "a complicated level of items," and the communications
between the officers and Moran-Soto regarding consent, which was a more
"simplified conversation about emptying your pockets." (SH Tr., p.123, L.6 p.124, L.23.) Utilizing this distinction, and its evaluation of the testimony at the
hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court concluded that it could not
find that Moran-Soto was properly administered Miranda warnings in a way he
could understand them, but that his limited English did allow him to communicate
with officers and give voluntary consent to search his pockets. (SH Tr., p.120,
L.18 - p.126, L.7.)
Moran-Soto contends that any consent he gave was the product of police
coercion. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-12.) In support of this proposition, Moran-Soto
highlights elements of the encounter that he alleges evidences the coercion of

the

officer^.^

(Appellant's brief, p.1I . ) In a totality of the circumstances analysis

however. none of these elements overcome Moran-Soto's clear verbal and nonverbal voluntary consent. Several of the elements, in fact, are merely incidental
occurrences of an encounter with police, such as the fact that the officers were
uniformed, and carrying badges and guns. While such facts can be considered
in a totality of the circumstances analysis, they do not in this instance bring into
doubt the voluntary consent offered by Moran-Soto, or the district court's denial
of the motion to suppress.
The district court correctly concluded that Moran-Soto's consent was
voluntary, given the totality of the circumstances. Moran-Soto has failed to show
error in the court's determination. This Court should uphold Moran-Soto's
conviction and the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the
methamphetamine found in his pockets.
D.

Even If The District Court Erred In Determininq Moran-Soto's Consent
Was Voluntarv, Suppression Was Precluded Bv The Inevitable Discovery
Doctrine
While concluding that the state had met its burden in proving that Moran-

Soto's consent to search his person was voluntarily given, the district court also
Moran-Soto contends that his consent was coerced by: (1) the fact that the
police officers were uniformed, and wearing both badges and guns (though their
guns were never drawn (SH Tr., p.58, Ls.5-8)). (2) prior to the search of MoranSoto, Officer Hemmert had ordered everyone "to stay where they are" (the district
court found, and Moran-Soto does not dispute, that the investigatory detentions
of Moran-Soto, Castro, and the bartender were all lawful) (Tr., p.119, L.23
p.120, L.6.); (3) after receiving Moran-Soto's identification card, Sergeant
Hoadley placed it back down on the bar rather than returning it to Moran-Soto;
and (4) Moran-Soto had witnessed the bartender resisting detention, and the
subsequent physical altercation between the bartender and the officers.
(Appellant's brief, p.1I.)

-

recognized that even if the state hadn't met this burden, the inevitable discovery
doctrine precluded the suppression of the methamphetamine. (SH Tr., p.126, L.8

- p.127, L.17.)
The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule.
See State v. Buterbau~h,138 ldaho 96, 101-102, 57 P.3d 807, 812-813 (Ct. App.
2002). Where the prosecution establishes by a preponderance of proof that the
evidence at issue inevitably would have been found by lawful means, then
exclusion of the evidence is improper even if it was actually obtained by
constitutionally improper means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984);
Stuart v. State, 136 ldaho 490, 497-98, 36 P.3d 1278, 1285-86 (2001). The
underlying rationale of this rule is that suppression should leave the prosecution
in the same position it would have been absent the police misconduct, not a
worse one.

1.

Nk,467 U.S. at 442-44; see also Buterbauah, 138 ldaho at 102, 57

The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Ap~liesTo The
Methamphetamine Found In Moran-Soto's Pockets

In Buterbauah, police and firefighters conducted a lawful warrantless
search of a basement.

a. at 98-100.

During this lawful search, they uncovered

evidence that would have been sufficient to obtain a valid search warrant for the
remainder of the residence.

a. at 101-103.

Before the warrant was obtained,

however, a firefighter unlawfully searched the upstairs rooms of the house, and
discovered more evidence, which was subsequently reported to police, who
seized it. @. at 98-101. The police then obtained a valid search warrant to
search the entire house.

a. at 101.

The ldaho Court of Appeals found that the

inevitable discovery doctrine applied to the evidence found upstairs, because by
the time of the unlawful upstairs search, the officers had already lawfully obtained
enough evidence for the valid search warrant that was eventually obtained, and
had actually presented that lawfully obtained evidence to the magistrate in
seeking the warrant.

a. at 101-103.

This valid warrant would have inevitably

yielded the upstairs evidence that was unlawfully seized.

a. Further, exclusion

of the evidence would have placed the state in a worse position that it would
have occupied without the constitutional violation, because it would have negated
a valid warrant.

a.

Similarly, in the present case, the officers had already obtained probable
cause to arrest Moran-Soto prior to their search of him. (See argument infra.)
Rather then arresting Moran-Soto at that point, which they were entitled to do,
they continued
and which would have inevitably yielded the metha~n~hetamine.~
the investigation and sought consent from Moran-Soto to search him. If that
consent was not voluntary, then the inevitable discovery doctrine must apply,
because, as in Butterbauah, exclusion of the evidence would place the state in a
worse position than it would have occupied without the constitutional violation,
because it would have negated the validly obtained probable cause to arrest.
Rather than Buterbauqh, Moran-Soto instead relies on State v. Bunting,
142 ldaho 908, 136 P.3d 379 (Ct. App. 2006). (Appellant's brief, pp.12-14.) He
contends that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply to this case
A search incident to arrest is a well established exception to the warrant
reauirement and, as such, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Chimel v.
~aiifornia,395 "s. 752, 762-63 (1969); State v. Kerley, 134 ldaho 870, 874, 11
P.3d 489,493 (Ct. App. 2000).

because that doctrine "is not based upon what an officer could or should do, but
rather upon what is actually happening," and there was no evidence that the
officers in this case were contemplating an arrest of Moran-Soto at the time he
was searched. (Appellant's brief, p.13.)
In Buntinq, the officers, as in Buterbaunh, had obtained evidence both
from a lawful initial search, and an unlawful subsequent search. Buntinq, 142
Idaho at 915-917, 126 P.3d at 386-388. The officers later obtained a search
warrant, but failed to present much of the lawfully obtained evidence to the
magistrate.

!cj.

Instead, they relied largely on the evidence that was later

determined to be unlawfully obtained. !cj. The Court of Appeals held that when
the unlawfully obtained evidence was excised from the total evidence that the
officers actually presented to the magistrate, the remaining lawfully obtained
evidence was insufficient to constitute probable cause for the search warrant.

Id.

Thus, the Court held, the warrant was invalid, and the inevitable discovery
doctrine did not apply to the unlawfully obtained evidence.

Id.

Further, the

exclusion of the unlawfully obtained evidence did not put the state in a worse
position than it was in without the constitutional violation, since the officers never
obtained a valid search warrant.

Id. In so holding, the Court described the scope

of the inevitable discovery doctrine as follows:
The underlying rationale of the inevitable discovery doctrine
is that a preponderance of the evidence proves that some action
that actually took place, or was in the process of taking place,
would have led to the discovery of the evidence that was already
obtained through unlawful police action. The inevitable discovery
doctrine was not intended to allow a court to consider what actions
the authorities should or could have taken and in doing so then

determine that lawful discovery of already unlawfully obtained
evidence would have been inevitable.
Id. at 916-917. Unlike
-

w,or the cases cited therein (United States v.

Reilly, 234 F.3d 986, 995 (gth Cir. 2000); State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 707
P.2d 493 (1985)). but as in Buterbauah, the action that would have led to the
discovery of the methamphetaminefound on Moran-Soto's person was already in
the process of taking place before the search. Prior to the discovery of the
methamphetamine, Moran-Soto had already been subject to a lawful
investigative detention, and the officer had already acquired probable cause to
arrest him. Thus, the district court was not required to consider "what actions the
authorities should or could have taken," because unlike in Bunting, the lawful
actions actually taken by the officers (observing the drugs on the bar,
interviewing Castro),

were

already

sufficient

to

lawfully

obtain

the

methamphetamine in Moran-Soto's pockets, pursuant to a search incident to
arrest.
Thus, the district court correctly determined that the inevitable discovery
doctrine applied to the methamphetamine.
2.

The District Court Correctly Determined That The Officers Had
Probable Cause To Arrest Moran-Soto Prior To Their Search Of

Him
Moran-Soto contends that even if the inevitable discovery doctrine could
apply, the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Moran-Soto until the
methamphetamine was found on his person, and thus, no lawful arrest that would
have yielded the methamphetamine was ineiitable. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.)
The district court, however, properly recognized that that the officers had

probable cause to arrest Moran-Soto prior to the search. (SH Tr., p.126, L.12 -

The standards for probable cause underlying an arrest were set forth in
State v. Kvsar, 116 Idaho 992,783 P.2d 859 (1989):
Reasonable or probable cause for an arrest exists where the
officer possesses information that would lead a person of ordinary
care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that the person arrested is guilty. In evaluating a police
officer's determination of probable cause in the field, a court must
take into account "the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act." In determining whether there is probable cause
for an arrest an officer is entitled to draw reasonable inferences
from the available information in light of the knowledge that he has
gained from his previous experience and training.
Id. at 993, 783 P.2d at 860 (citations omitted).
In this case, the officers had probable cause to arrest Moran-Soto prior to
their search of him.5 As the district court explained:
Here's what the officer had. The drugs on the bar closer to
Mr. I thought one of the officers testified it was kind of between
the defendant and Mr. Castro, but I think the sum and substance it
was over more by Mr. Castro, and he's the one that pushed it
across the bar.

-

In determining that the officers had probable cause to arrest Moran-Soto prior
to their search of him, the district court refers to "statements by those individuals
that the defendant was trying to sell drugs." (SH Tr., p.126, L.24 - p.127, L.1.)
On appeal, Moran-Soto contends that this was a clearly erroneous factual
finding, since the record indicates that only one individual, Castro, told the
officers that Moran-Soto was attempting to sell drugs at the bar. (Appellant's
brief, pp.14-15.) While there is no evidence in the record that this was anything
more than a misstatement by the court (the court later specifically referred to only
Castro giving the information (SH Tr., p.123, Ls.2-4)), or that the district court's
decision hinged on the number of informants, the state agrees that this Court
should disregard any "factual finding" that the bartender provided information to
the officers.

Certainly when the Officer Hemmert went behind the bar, the
reasonable conclusions were when he discovered they were drugs
that it was either the bartender or Mr. Castro had the drugs. And I
think that was a fair agreement, and that they didn't conclude the
defendant had the drugs.
It's then accompanied by statements by those individuals
that the defendant was trying to sell drugs. That is sufficient
enough probable cause for an officer to make a determination to
arrest.
(SHTr., p.126, L.12-p.127,L.3.)
The officers had probable cause to arrest Moran-Soto before the search of
his person. That justified a search incident to arrest, and the discovery of the
methamphetamine found in Moran-Soto's pocket thus falls under the inevitable
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.
E.

The Officers' Search of Moran-Soto Was A P r o ~ e Search
r
Incident To

Arrest

Finally, even if the district court's inevitable discovery analysis was
incorrect, Moran-Soto's claim must still fail because the officers were allowed to
search Moran-Soto incident to his subsequent arrest. If there is probable cause
to arrest a suspect, a search, even in the absence of an arrest that precedes the
search, may be considered a valid search incident to arrest. State v. Schwarz,
133 ldaho 463, 468, 988 P.2d 689, 694 (1999) (because officer had probable
cause to arrest Schwarz, officer's pat down search was a valid search incident to
arrest); State V. Kerley, 134 ldaho 870, 874, 11 P.3d 489, 493 (Ct. App. 2000)
(search incident to arrest is exception to warrant requirement that may be
submitted as alternative theory to justify pat down). Thus, because the officers
had probable cause to arrest Moran-Soto, Moran-Soto cannot claim the less

intrusive search was constitutionally prohibited.

See State v. Schwarz, 133 ldaho

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Moran-Soto's
conviction and the district court's denial of his motion to suppress.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2010.
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